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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Remote control of migration: theorising territoriality, shared
coercion, and deterrence
David Scott FitzGerald
Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California San Diego, USA
ABSTRACT
‘Remote control’ has been a radical innovation that projects many
aspects of migration and border enforcement beyond a state’s
territory. Scholars across multiple disciplines make distinctive and
sometimes contradictory claims about the extent to which state
control over space and geographic borders is of declining
signiﬁcance. Drawing on a study of remote control policies in the
United States, Canada, the EU, and Australia since the 1930s, this
paper argues that states push much of their migration control out
from their territorial boundaries though a process of extra-
territorialisation. However, these liberal states simultaneously
ratchet up controls at a ﬁnely calibrated border line in a process
of hyper-territorialisation. The goal of restricting migrants’ access
to territorialised human and civil rights drives both of these
manipulations of territoriality. A taxonomy of controls based on
the metaphor of an ‘architecture of repulsion’ describes their logic
and practice. Many of these practices involve states sharing the
legitimate means of coercion over movement in a way that
challenges a core assumption about modern states. The degree to
which remote control deters unauthorised migration remains a
critical research question, but there is more deterrence than found






Aristide Zolberg (1997) coined ‘remote border control’ to describe the transatlantic system
of visas issued by consulates abroad and outbound passenger screening at European ports
that took shape in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He observed that control
at the point of embarkation ‘is now so familiar that we tend to underestimate its radically
innovative character and its fundamental importance in regulating world-wide movement’
(1997, 308). Scholars from across the social sciences and legal studies have developed
similar concepts to show how governments use space to regulate migration beyond the
transatlantic context (McKeown 2008). Like borders, remote controls are used to ﬁlter,
and not simply to exclude. Their raison d’être, however, is the capacity to exclude,
winnow, and ‘cull the masses’ according to shifting criteria of admission and rejection
(FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014; Spijkerboer 2018).
Diﬀerent camps dispute the extent to which international borders, and space more gen-
erally, have become less important for constraining mobility. In the most extreme formu-
lations, ‘the border is everywhere’ (Lyon 2013) or ‘vanishing’ (Maguire 2016). Other
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scholars identify a more limited shift in partly projecting border control beyond a state’s
territory (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Lavenex 2006; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011). There is
no consensus on how far contemporary practices have reshaped classical understandings
of borders and sovereignty.
Properly identifying the shifting relationships among space, rights, mobile people, and
state control is important for reasons of both theory and public policy. First, rights of per-
sonhood, whether based on universalistic principles such as human rights or national con-
stitutional principles of civil rights, continue to be resolutely territorialised in practice.
States try to push migration control away from their territorial boundaries as they simul-
taneously ratchet up controls at the border line itself to restrict migrants’ access to human
and civil rights. Extra-territorialisation, pushing controls outside the state’s territory, takes
place at the same time, and obeys the same logic, as hyper-territorialisation, enacting con-
trols and creating legal meanings through ﬁne spatial distinctions at the border line.
Migration control takes place on a continuum of space, from the most remote practices
half a planet away down to walls at the state boundary, where remote control merges
with border line control.
Second, the externalisation of migration controls shifts understandings of how states
‘monopolize the legitimate means of movement’ (Torpey 2018). Modern states, as
opposed to private actors, maintain that authority, but individual states often do not mon-
opolise control within their territories. States often collaborate to control movement.
States that are more powerful in the ‘hierarchy of sovereignty’ (Lake 2009) reach into
other countries’ territories to try to shape outmigration and transit. The legitimacy of
those eﬀorts is contested, which is why extra-territorial state action is often conducted
in secret or publicly framed as friendly cooperation even when stronger states coerce
the weaker.
Pragmatically, understanding how remote control articulates with enforcement at the
edge of a state’s territory shows how a sometimes hidden system for selecting and control-
ling migrants works in practice. The analysis provides a serious answer to the question,
‘Why don’t asylum seekers just get into line to come legally?’ States systematically block
most legal paths for people ﬂeeing violence and persecution. Strategies for eﬀective civil
society surveillance of state practices and for judicial and parliamentary oversight of the
executive branch are shaped by exactly where practices of remote control take place. Advo-
cates have enjoyed far greater success in arguing for state accountability in the liminal
spaces at state borders than in activities carried out by proxies on foreign territory.
Finally, precise speciﬁcation of the spatial dynamics of control is a critical condition for
assessing how eﬀective states are at controlling unauthorised migration.
Whither territoriality?
Much of the leading work on remote control derives from the idiosyncratic process of Eur-
opeanisation. Vedsted-Hansen’s (1994, 255) pioneering study of the Danish case described
the ‘externalisation’ of asylum procedures, a term that has gained wide currency to under-
stand policies to keep out asylum seekers and other types of mobile people (Boswell 2003;
Zaiotti 2016). Similarly, Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) and Lavenex (2006) explained why
states push the site of migration control ‘out’ from their borders as part of a broader eﬀort
to manipulate scales of policymaking in diﬀerent directions to avoid the constraints of
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domestic institutions such as judiciaries, more rights-oriented foreign ministries, and
NGOs. Legal studies of the outward shift in immigration, border, and asylum control
often characterise these moves as ‘extra-territorial’ (Bernard and Mitsilegas 2010; Lax
2017).
van Munster and Sterkx (2006, 238) make a bolder claim of a ‘deterritorialization of
control’. In their view, ‘Although the physical location of the geographical border still pos-
sesses important symbolic value, the control of migration ﬂows is increasingly pushed out-
wards’ (2006, 245). Borders are sites of performing sovereignty. The practices, more than
the places, are the key point in these accounts (Paasi 2009). Control over mobility increas-
ingly takes place when state agents and their contractors interact electronically with data-
bases of biometric registries that have no real physical location (Amoore 2006). For Lyon
(2013), the advent of identity cards and the mass surveillance it engenders means ‘the
border is everywhere’. Maguire’s (2016) analysis of many of the same technologies leads
him to the opposite conclusion of ‘vanishing borders’ as control and the privilege of mobi-
lity becomes more individualised. Hence, the key term to describe remote control from
postmodern perspectives is de-territorialisation, in which the territoriality of the border
becomes less signiﬁcant.
Many substantive practices of remote control in these accounts are the same, but the
conceptualisation of space diﬀers. Legal scholars and political scientists are more likely
than human geographers, critical border studies theorists, and anthropologists to take
for granted that there is a hard, territorial border, as conventionally conceived. For the
former group, the novelty of remote control lies in a set of additional activities that
takes place outside this hard border, inside the territory of another state, or in inter-
national waters. Hence, the critical term in most legalistic accounts is extra-territorial to
describe activities that take place outside the state’s territory, rather than de-territorialisa-
tion, in which territory is losing signiﬁcance.
The construction of border fortiﬁcations and deployment of other bordering practices
clearly serves the goal of symbolically drawing national boundaries and creating the
impression for domestic constituents that the state has the ability to select which
foreigners are allowed to enter (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Yet an analytical
risk in focusing on the de-territorialisation of borders and their ephemerality is losing
sight of how the externalisation of some controls coincides with the hyper-territorialisa-
tion of other aspects of border control. At the same time as states push control far
outside their territories, they draw micro distinctions in space to demarcate exactly
where their territories begin, and they increasingly mark those spaces with material fortiﬁ-
cations (see Vallet 2014).
Mondrian’s tape measure
Border lines regulating access to rights have not always been so clean. The territorial div-
isions of the planet were long characterised by the vague frontiers of empires and tribes,
fragmented archipelagos of principalities, and overlapping loyalties to religious and
secular leaders. The transformation of the world’s political geography from what looked
like an expressionist painting by Oskar Kokoschka to the clean, neo-plastic lines of Piet
Mondrian, in the famous metaphor of Ernest Gellner (1983, 139–40), is a feature of
modern nation-states.
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In its classical Weberian deﬁnition, the state is an organisation with a monopoly over
legitimate coercion in a territory. Modern states also guarantee rights of citizens, and to
varying degrees, of noncitizens on their territories. ‘Rights of territorial personhood’
(Motomura 2006) are not always equal to rights of citizens, but they oﬀer a panoply of
civil rights protections and some social rights by virtue of an individual’s presence in a
jurisdiction. The strongest versions of territorial personhood are enjoyed regardless of citi-
zenship or legal status. They are available to foreigners who move for all kinds of reasons,
from labour migration to asylum seeking. These civil rights are most robust in liberal
states. Thus, both coercion and protection of rights within a territory are core functions
of liberal states. Remote controls are designed to extend controls beyond the state’s terri-
tory to restrict access to those rights.
Most states lack the ability to project their power abroad tomanage potential immigrants
using the full range of remote control techniques deployed by the rich, liberal states of the
Global North. Authoritarian and hybrid states also engage in remote control, but they use a
narrower set of tools such as restrictive visas. Like liberal states, they aremotivated by secur-
ity, economic, and political concerns about selecting who enters (see Cook-Martín 2013;
Czaika, de Haas, and Villares-Varela 2017). Unlike liberal states, however, illiberal states
do not have the additional interest of patrolling access to territorial rights of personhood.
The most authoritarian states can deport foreigners when and however they please.
In liberal states, just where access to rights begin in space is legally contested. For
example, in 2019, U.S. agents and private security guards stood on the line between
Mexico and the United States to prevent asylum seekers from setting their toe on U.S.
soil unless they ﬁrst produced a U.S. passport or visa (ﬁeld notes 19 June 2019; DHS
OIG 2019). On a number of occasions, U.S. agents on U.S. territory have ﬁred shots
into Mexico that killed Mexican nationals, raising legal questions about whether those
killed had U.S. constitutional rights, including one case where a dead man’s head fell in
Mexico but his legs in the United States, and the U.S. government denied he had any
U.S. constitutional rights (Dolven 2017).
These practices show that borders are not becoming de-territorialised tout court. While
theorists rightly observe that borders’ lines on the map and their meaning are contingent
social constructions (Collyer and King 2015), those constructions harden when territorial
divisions map on to legal jurisdiction. Whether a non-citizen’s rights derive from universal
human rights or national constitutions, in practice, their activation is conditional on the
individual’s position in space. Governments directly or indirectly project their control far
beyond their territories at the same time as they make micro-distinctions in space
measured with a ruler to circumscribe migrants’ access to rights. Extra-territorial
control that pushes some aspects of border control far out across the land, air, and sea,
and into the digital ether, is part of the same system of hyper-territorial control that
increasingly makes space matter to an extreme degree.
The ‘Hippocratic bubble’
Policies around access to asylum are a strategic site to highlight both the extra-territoria-
lised qualities of remote control and hyper-territorialised access to rights. Many govern-
ments accept an individual’s right to ask for asylum, but only if the application is made
from particular spaces – at or within their borders. Of the world’s 195 countries, 148
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have signed the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol that include the principle of
non-refoulement of refugees. Hathaway’s (1992) concept of ‘non-entrée’ shows how
states control refugees’ movement without accepting responsibility for them (Gammel-
toft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015). From its origins in the 1930s and 1940s targeting
Jewish refugees from fascism trying to reach the Americas, liberal European states, and
Palestine, remote controls of refugees have expanded to a robust global system (FitzGerald
2019).
Remote controls targeting asylum seekers follow the same logic as other organisations
that control access to spaces in which norms are activated. For example, Portes, Fernán-
dez-Kelly, and Light (2012) describe how U.S. hospitals often deliberately create obstacles
between sick people seeking care and the doctors who took the Hippocratic Oath to render
aid to those in need. Only patients with the insurance or ﬁnancial resources to get past a
hospital’s clerical gatekeepers, security guards, and physical barriers surrounding the
examination room can reach a space where the doctor’s norm to render aid is triggered.
What Portes and colleagues call a ‘Hippocratic bubble’ is driven by the same logic of
controlling space that puts up barriers to keep out asylum seekers. The fact that refugees
have unique rights of non-refoulement under international, and most national, law, gives
states added incentives to control their access to the territory. Recall, however, that liberal
states grant considerable rights to anyone present on their territory, regardless of whether
they are plausibly refugees, and thus the logic of liberal states deterring access to territorial
rights of personhood extends to a far wider range of mobile persons than asylum seekers
alone.
Sharing the legitimate means of movement
The spread of remote control reveals howmessy the exercise of sovereignty has become even
in a world of nation-states. Torpey (2018) describes how governments from the late eight-
eenth to early twentieth century invented passports and visas. States monopolised ‘the legit-
imate means of movement’ by taking away the authority to control their subjects’movement
from private actors like feudal landlords, slave-masters, and employers of indentured ser-
vants. In an overlapping process in Europe that began in the sixteenth century in France
and continued into the twentieth century in Italy, states took away from the Catholic
Church the medieval right to grant asylum in churches (Orchard 2014, 49).
As Torpey points out, private actors have continued to be involved in practices of con-
trolling movement in ways that are both familiar (passenger transportation companies)
and novel in the early twenty-ﬁrst century (visa processing). While there are handsome
proﬁts to be made in migration control (McNevin 2011), the fundamental point is not
so much about private capital shaping state migration control, but rather, states using
their authority over private actors to enforce controls. Those controls and selection pro-
cesses may beneﬁt particular groups of employers, but they obey a statist logic and are con-
tingent on government authority.
The novelty in the contemporary system of remote control is that governments reach
out beyond their territories in extensive, routine collaboration to select or deter millions of
individuals trying to cross borders. Nation-states, as an institutional form, continue to
monopolise the legitimate means of movement, but individual states often do not monop-
olise control within their territories. States share information about individuals with each
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other and often collaborate to decide whom to detain, deport, or allow to pass. Govern-
ments in migrants’ countries of origin and transit are often doing the work of remote
control on behalf of a destination state, and transit states are pressured to grant asylum
to refugees they do not want. Control is not always monopolised by a single state. Coercion
is shared.
A taxonomy of remote control
Remote control is a set of practices, physical structures, and institutions whose goal is
control the mobility of individuals while they are outside the territory of their intended
destination state. One goal is to ﬁlter migrants and select whom can pass. Another goal
is to identify, monitor, detain, deport, and deter the unwanted through an architecture
of repulsion. I use metaphors derived from medieval fortresses to render visible the bor-
dering practices that are often described by scholars in excessively ephemeral terms (cf.
Lyon 2013; Maguire 2016); to emphasise the hard barriers in Euclidian space that
create immobility in a world of supposed ﬂows (Favell 2001); and to insist that controls
over particular spaces continue to coexist with controls based on ethereal electronic data-
bases and a chronological record of entries and exits (cf. Bigo 2014). Together these
analytical metaphors (López 2001) show how diﬀerent parts of the system work together
in the air, on land, and at sea.
The architecture of repulsion is based on cages for the unwanted in their places of origin
or remote foreign territories; patrols in themoats of international waters; the construction
of an aerial dome that keeps out unwanted air passengers; land buﬀers that turn countries
of transit into traps; and the legal ﬁctions of barbican spaces where exceptionally restric-
tive rules apply. These barbicans bump up against walls and other physical fortiﬁcations
deﬁning the sharp edge of the state’s territory, where remote control merges into classical
border control. All of these practices are facilitated by the ﬁles that document the identities
and oﬃcial assessments of individual travellers.
Files
Max Weber identiﬁed ‘the ﬁles’ as one of the constitutive features of modern bureaucracy.
The passport has ancient roots but spread as a generalised requirement for international
travel around World War I. The inclusion of ever more sophisticated biometric data in
travel documents, beginning with written descriptions of the bearer’s body and expanding
to include ﬁngerprints and photographs, allowed states to establish an individual’s identity
and link it to biographical information from population registries and other records. The
advent of visas issued abroad by countries of destination as a prerequisite for admission
turned travel documents into the indispensable tool of remote control (Cook-Martín
2013; Torpey 2018).
Visa and passport policy has been used for decades to deter unwanted refugees. Liberal
European states and governments throughout the Americas adopted increasingly restric-
tive visa policies on Jewish refugees and pressured their neighbours to do the same (Caes-
tecker and Moore 2010; FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014). Since the 1980s, many
countries, such as Canada, Germany, and the UK, have continued to impose visa require-
ments on nationalities with the open goal of deterring asylum-seeking. The visa regime
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quietly keeps irregular migrants, including asylum seekers, away from the rich, liberal
Global North, operationalised here as the membership of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development with the exception of Turkey and Mexico. Most OECD
states have visa restrictions on most Asian and African nationalities. Those restrictions
have increased since the 1970s (Czaika, de Haas, and Villares-Varela 2017). In 2019 the
top ten source countries of refugees were all among the world’s thirty most restricted
nationalities. At the extremes, Afghans and Iraqis could access only 30 countries
without a visa, while Japanese, South Koreans, and Singaporeans could access 189
countries (Henley 2018; UNHCR 2018). Visa requirements often have a ‘domino eﬀect’
as governments enact restrictions to prevent the entrance of unwanted migrants barred
from other countries.
The advent of electronic databases has greatly increased the amount of information
about individuals that governments can collect, their ability to link multiple sources of
data, the speed of retrieval, and the ability to share it with other governments and
private businesses contracted or incentivised to do the work of remote control. No-ﬂy
lists prevent individuals labelled as security threats from ever boarding an aircraft (Bigo
2014). The EURODAC ﬁngerprinting system was designed in part with the goal of regis-
tering asylum seekers at Europe’s external borders so they could be returned to the ﬁrst EU
country they entered if they tried to ﬁle for asylum in another EU country. The United
States ﬁnances scanning equipment, hardware, and software for migration databases in
Latin American countries in return for access to the data (FitzGerald 2019).
Cages
Caging attempts to keeps refugees in their countries of origin or camps in other countries.
Techniques fall along a continuum of coercion. The hardest tool is military intervention.
Since the 1990s, states with powerful militaries have established ‘safe havens’ in countries
such as Iraq and the former Yugoslavia with an explicit goal of preventing refugees from
ﬂeeing to other countries (Dubernet 2001). Governments in the Global North work with
the UNHCR and International Organization for Migration to fund refugee camps, centres
for asylum seekers, and repatriation operations. Camps combine provision of basic human
needs with surveillance and control. Most caging occurs in the Global South in a ‘grand
compromise’ in which the Global North pays Southern neighbours to keep refugees
away from the North in return for limited resettlements and ﬁnancial aid (Cuellar 2006).
The greatest diﬀerence in caging strategies is in oﬀshore processing of asylum seekers.
The governments of various EU members since the 1980s have proposed oﬀshore proces-
sing of claims made by asylum seekers intercepted at sea, but as of summer 2019, none of
these plans had concretised. Australia has the most robust oﬀshore processing system in
Papua New Guinea and Nauru. The Australian model remains unusual because processing
and long detention takes place in another sovereign state through which asylum seekers
did not pass before interception, and even recognised refugees are not allowed to settle
in Australia under the iteration of oﬀshore processing current in 2019. The Australian
government in practice has strong inﬂuence and sometimes outright control over the
process in another sovereign state (Dastyari 2015; FitzGerald 2019).
Designating a country of origin as ‘safe’ is a legal tool aimed at easing the deportation of
asylum seekers of particular nationalities. Canada had a ‘designated country of origin’
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policy that served the same function from 2012 to 2019. Fourteen EUmember states estab-
lished lists of safe countries of origin by 2018, and eﬀorts were under way to create a
common EU list (European Migration Network 2018).
The softest tool of caging is publicity campaigns on billboards, radio jingles, videos,
Internet advertising, and even graphic novels, to convince potential asylum seekers to
stay home. Governments in North America, Europe, and Australia all have deployed pub-
licity campaigns (FitzGerald 2019).
Domes
A virtual dome over territories restricts access by air. Sanctions against airlines that trans-
port inadmissible passengers make check-in clerks the proxies of the destination state. The
contemporary dome over North American and Australian airspace was derived from con-
trols over transoceanic ship passengers in the nineteenth century. Internationally, the 1944
Convention on International Civil Aviation and 2000 UN Anti-Smuggling Protocol
required airlines to check passengers’ travel documents. Sanctions regimes on airlines
accelerated through the 1980s in Europe (Scholten 2015; FitzGerald 2019).
Digital ﬁles are the basis of controlling air passengers. As of 2017, 56 countries, includ-
ing the United States, Canada, Australia, and many EU countries, deployed an Advance
Passenger Information System in which electronic records are sent to destination states
before an aircraft takes oﬀ (OSCE 2017). Liaison oﬃcers stationed abroad advise the air-
lines whom to prohibit from boarding. The UK began deploying carrier liaisons in 1983,
Canada and Australia in 1989, the United States in 1993, and the EU in 1996.
While liaison oﬃcers cannot formally deny boarding, pre-clearance oﬃcers have that
authority. Pre-clearance has precedent in screening of U.S.-bound sea passengers by
U.S. agents at Canadian ports beginning in 1894. Beginning in 1952, the United States
established air passenger pre-clearance in Toronto that was expanded to ﬁfteen foreign
airports, as far as away as Abu Dhabi, where passengers must clear U.S. passport and
customs control. American agents at Canadian airports carry ﬁrearms during checks.
The U.S. government plays with sovereign jurisdiction in pre-clearance spaces by prose-
cuting passengers under U.S. law for crimes committed there, such as smuggling, but
refusing to allow asylum applications (FitzGerald 2019).
Conceptually similar to pre-clearance spaces are the juxtaposed controls in British,
French, and Belgian rail stations and ferry ports to screen passengers crossing the
English Channel. British agents are stationed on French soil and vice versa. Travellers
cannot apply for asylum in the destination country in these spaces even if they are inter-
acting with agents from the destination state (Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010). Unlike the U.S.
air passenger pre-clearance programme, juxtaposed controls are symmetrical in practice
and take place on land. They are all theoretically important because there is not a
single state monopolising the legitimate means of movement. Rather, agents operate on
the soil of partner states to carry out collaborative controls.
Buﬀers
States in the Global North use other countries as buﬀers to keep out unwanted migrants in
transit. The most intense buﬀering involves the EU in Africa and Turkey, the United States
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in Latin America, and Australia in Indonesia. At the extreme end of shared coercion,
agents of powerful states operate in the territory of a foreign buﬀer. More commonly,
powerful states apply political pressure on buﬀers to act by proxy in return for other
goodies in the bilateral relationship. Policing tools include the provision of training, equip-
ment, and intelligence. Legal tools include demanding stricter visas, the criminalisation of
irregular migration, readmission agreements in which the buﬀer states agree to take back
rejected migrants who passed through their territory, and safe-third country designations
(FitzGerald 2019).
‘Safe third country’ designations deny asylum to applicants who passed through a
named buﬀer country where they will not be persecuted. The designations are common
in Europe, but less so in Australia, and historically were a side note in North America
until the Trump administration. Denmark was the ﬁrst country in Europe to adopt a
safe third country scheme, beginning in 1986. The policies then spread through the
Dublin asylum system that governs which member state is responsible for assessing
claims. In 2017, twelve EU countries had some form of additional safe third country pro-
vision (Asylum Information Database 2017). Australia passed a safe third country law in
1994 (Kneebone 2009).
The United States and Canada mutually buﬀer each other through a safe third country
agreement whose groundwork was laid in 1994 and which took eﬀect in 2004. Beginning
in 2018, the Trump administration exerted strong pressure on Mexican authorities to sign
a safe third country agreement so that the United States could return asylum seekers who
passed throughMexico. TheMexican government refused through early 2019, but in prac-
tice admitted thousands of third country nationals who applied for asylum in the United
States and were forced to return to Mexico to await their hearing date in the United States
(Human Rights Watch 2019b). The Trump administration also pressured the govern-
ments of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua to sign bilateral agreements to process
asylum seekers in ways that would buﬀer the United States, as well as creating a unilateral
policy that prevented most foreigners arriving at the U.S. southern border from being able
to seek asylum if they had passed through another country (Narea 2019).
Several states have forced asylum seekers to wait outside their borders in a buﬀer state
for permission to enter in small, controlled numbers. For example, beginning in 2016,
Hungary limited the daily number of asylum seekers crossing from Serbia (Asylum Infor-
mation Database 2018). A similar system of ‘metering’ was established by the Trump
administration at the border with Mexico in the summer of 2018 (Metering Update
May 2019). Safe third country, metering, and similar policies forced on transit countries
by more powerful patrons reach into their sovereign spaces to control movement. These
interventions also shape grants of asylum in the buﬀers in ways that share what was for-
mally the classical monopolisation of these practices by individual states (see Orchard
2014, 49; Torpey 2018).
Moats
States use international waters as a moat to keep out the unwanted by intercepting boats
carrying passengers without visas. The most prominent early instance involving refugees
in the Americas was the refusal of Cuban, U.S., and Canadian authorities to allow the
landing of the St. Louis, a passenger ship carrying nearly 1000 German Jews in 1939
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(New York Times 1939). During the British Mandate in Palestine, maritime interceptions
were a key strategy to keep Jews from entering clandestinely. In a context of weak rights of
territorial personhood and a weak norm of non-refoulement, maritime interception was
driven by practical concerns about the greater diﬃculty of controlling ship passengers
on the beach, rather than preventing them from accessing rights by entering the territory
(Yahil 1974).
The U.S., Australian, and European governments have all conducted interceptions of
migrants in international waters to prevent them from reaching their territorial waters
and coasts. The U.S. policy began in a sustained way in 1981 to block Haitians. Maritime
interceptions of people attempting to leave islands are the most extreme form of externa-
lising borders. These operations not only control entry to the United States, but also mar-
itime exit from an island like Haiti to any destination. The island state becomes a cage for
its citizens that is guarded by a foreign power.
President Ronald Reagan’s 1981 order establishing the Caribbean migrant interdiction
programme stated that refugees would not be refouled. However, during a large increase in
outﬂows from Haiti in 1992, President George H. Bush issued a new order making the
principle of non-refoulement discretionary on the high seas. The Supreme Court ruled
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993) that the order was legal, even as the
court recognised that the order’s goal was to prevent refugees from reaching U.S. territory
where they could activate non-refoulement protections.
Hyper-territorialisation reached new extremes under the U.S. wet foot, dry foot policy
from the mid-1990s to January 2017 that exclusively applied to Cubans. The U.S. Coast
Guard immediately repatriated the vast majority of Cubans intercepted at sea unless
they passed a shipboard asylum screening. Cubans who reached dry land were usually
paroled into the United States. Lawsuits about whether Cubans were on dry U.S. land
when they reached an abandoned section of bridge or a lighthouse in the Florida Keys,
both places that were unequivocally in U.S. territory, highlighted the Kafkaesque games
around territoriality (FitzGerald 2019). The combination of weak rights outside U.S. ter-
ritory and strong rights within have prompted the U.S. government to prevent aircraft car-
rying potential asylum seekers from even brieﬂy landing on U.S. territories for refuelling.
Repatriation ﬂights take circuitous routes to land in third countries or U.S.-controlled ter-
ritories where the Immigration and Nationality Act does not apply, such as Wake Island
and Guantanamo (Smith 1999).
The EU’s maritime interceptions have two distinctive traits. The ﬁrst is coordination of
member state external operations through Frontex since 2006, which involves extensive
deployments in the Mediterranean and oﬀ West Africa. The second unusual trait is that
all EU member states are subject to the supranational jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Italian case demonstrates both dynamics. Italy
instituted pushbacks at sea, which do not allow asylum claims, oﬀ Libya in 2009.
However, the ECtHR held in Hirsi Jamma and Others v. Italy [2012] that jurisdiction is
not simply a question of territory. When a state uses paramilitary force to intercept a
boat in international waters, it exercises eﬀective jurisdiction over the passengers and
must follow the principle of non-refoulement. The Italian government’s solution to
these judicial constraints was to pay the Libyan Coast Guard and the same militias that
previously had been smuggling migrants to detain them in grim conditions that included
torture and slavery (Human Rights Watch 2019a).
10 D. S. FITZGERALD
The Australian government has innovated several new maritime remote control pol-
icies. While it accepted many asylum seekers arriving by sea from Indochina in the
1970s, it eventually cut oﬀ the irregular ﬂow by paying governments like Indonesia to
detain asylum seekers until they could be resettled as part of international agreements
involving countries of origin, transit, and resettlement (Higgins 2017). The second
major innovation loosely based on U.S. policy in the Caribbean was the Paciﬁc Solution
I from 2001 to 2007 and a revised version beginning in 2012. Australian forces intercepted
asylum seekers in the contiguous zone outside Australia’s territorial waters and forcibly
transported them to Nauru or Papua New Guinea for processing. Unlike the U.S. policies,
these involved extended detentions in sovereign countries through which the asylum
seekers had not passed. Various policies since 2001 have forced boats back to Indonesian
waters and collaborated with Indonesian authorities to prevent embarkation (Ghezelbash
2018).
Maritime operations regularly involve shared coercion over travellers’movement. Since
the early 1990s, the United States has signed numerous bilateral agreements providing for
shipriders from other countries to be stationed on U.S. vessels and authorise entering
those countries’ territorial waters to intercept irregular migrants and smugglers (Robinson
2009; Pratt and Templeman 2018). Similarly, Mauritanian oﬃcials act as shipriders on
Spanish vessels (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, and Pickles 2014). States collaborate to
control migrants trying to cross the moat.
Barbicans
The ﬁnal strategy of remote control is to create spaces at the margins of a territory where
restrictive rules apply. Medieval castles often included a fortiﬁed gate house, or barbican,
outside the walls of the main castle. I use the metaphor of barbicans to describe liminal
spaces at the territory’s edge where rights are limited (Neuman 1996). They include
diﬀerent forms – gulag, classical, frontier, and airport – described below and ordered by
their distance from the state’s boundary.
Gulag barbicans are liminal zones under a single state’s control where fewer rights are
recognised than in the rest of the state’s territory. Since at least 1977, the U.S. government
has used its naval base at Guantanamo Bay to detain migrants and screen asylum seekers.
A similar programme in the 1990s used the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands,
where U.S. immigration law did not apply at the time, to screen asylum seekers (Mountz
2011; Dastyari 2015).
In Australia, Christmas Island was among the islands that parliament designated
‘excised oﬀshore places’ in 2001. Irregular maritime arrivals in these places were denied
the right to apply for a visa, including a protection visa, and were subject to removal to
foreign counties such as Nauru for asylum processing. Parliament excised broader
swathes of Australian territory in 2005, and in 2013, the entire country was ‘excised’ as
irregular maritime arrivals were barred from seeking asylum without the extraordinary
permission of the immigration minister (Ghezelbash 2018). A distinctive version of the
gulag barbican was the Australian policy from 2007 to 2012 of intercepting asylum
seekers arriving by sea without visas and taking them to Christmas Island. Unlike
Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s Manus island, where oﬀshore processing takes place as
described above in the section on cages, Christmas Island is indisputably under Australia
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sovereignty. Yet the Australian government applied special restrictive rules on Christmas
Island that allowed for asylum screening outside the protections of the migration statute
and without recourse to appeals before the Refugee Review Tribunal or Administrative
Appeals Tribunal. Oﬃcials from the immigration department decided asylum cases
based on non-binding guidelines.
The classical barbican strategy is to designate spaces with limited rights at the edge of a
territory’s physical border fortiﬁcations. For example, the Hungarian government built a
fence along its border with Serbia beginning in 2015 to keep out Syrians and other asylum
seekers. Applicants were forced to wait in ‘pre-transit zones’ on the Serbian side of the
fence before reaching the ‘transit zone’ and only then allowed into Hungary proper
(Asylum Information Database 2018).
A frontier barbican designates spaces within the territory and a speciﬁed distance from
the border as conveying fewer rights. The idea of a frontier zone retreats from the clean
border lines that characterise modern states to an extended space that is often many kilo-
metres wide, where asylum seekers can be pushed back without hearing their claims.
These are not detention spaces, as in the gulag barbican of Christmas Island. Rather, they
are spaces where foreigners can be expelled with fewer rights protections than if they had
reached farther into the interior. Restrictive spaces are often accompanied by a speciﬁc time-
line during which rights are limited. For example, Israel’s 2007 policy of ‘hot returns’ allowed
the military to push back asylum seekers within 50 kilometres of the Egyptian border if they
were caught within 24 hours of crossing (Kritzman-Amir and Spijkerboer 2013).
The airport barbican is among the most radical legal ﬁctions. Restricted rights to claim
asylum, talk to lawyers and translators in person, and appeal negative decisions are
endemic in international ‘transit zones’ in airports. Foreigners are treated as if they
were not fully inside the country’s territory even if the airport is hundreds of kilometres
in the interior. Access to some rights is hyper-territorialised by a door between diﬀerent
parts of the airport. Despite a 1992 ruling by the ECtHR in Amuur v. France that
airport transit zones are inside a state’s territory and that asylum seekers have rights
within them, European states continue to maintain more restrictive asylum policies in
these spaces (Basaran 2008). Frontier and airport barbicans include what is indisputably
sovereign territory of the controlling state. A reader might object that these types of con-
trols are not remote at all. However, both the frontier and airport barbicans were designed
to fulﬁl the same basic function of restricting rights in designated spaces under a state’s
control as the gulag and classical variations. While geographically proximate, these
spaces have been rendered legally remote.
Conclusion
A taxonomy of remote control in the air, on land, and at sea catalogues how governments
use those spaces to ﬁlter travellers and exclude the unwanted before they reach the state’s
territory. The metaphor of an architecture of repulsion renders visible a system of cages,
domes, buﬀers, moats, and barbicans patrolled by state agents and their proxies who
operate in secret or spaces inaccessible to the public. All of these structures operate
more eﬃciently, and in part are based on, the ﬁles of travel documents and databases.
By discussing these structures as a system of control, it is possible to observe how each
of the structures is linked to another. When caging fails, visa policy and carrier sanctions
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make it diﬃcult to board an aircraft and ﬂy to the destination. Travellers then try to cross
the moat, but maritime interceptions push them back into gulag barbicans like Guanta-
namo, cages like Nauru, or coastal buﬀer states like Libya. When the system is viewed
in its totality, it becomes clear why so many unauthorised migrants, including asylum
seekers, did not simply get into line to wait their legal turn. There often is no line.
States have deliberately blocked most paths, even for refugees.
Given the convergence on a wide range of remote control policies throughout the rich
countries of the Global North, how should one assess its ‘radically innovative character’
(Zolberg 1997, 308)? This analysis requires careful speciﬁcation of space and avoiding
the postmodern impulse to throw geography out of the study of geography (Favell 2007,
269). Borders are not everywhere or nowhere. One of the main drivers of the logic of
remote control is that the precise location of the border line matters. Keeping migrants
far away from the border is not driven by the demise of territoriality, but rather, its increas-
ing relevance as access to rights is conditioned on a foreigner’s position in space. The exter-
nalisation of border control maintains the bubble around norms and rights that limits their
activation because political borders are tied to legal jurisdiction. Measures to externalise
control thousands of kilometres away through selective issuance of visas and controls at
airports of embarkation simultaneously take place with hyper-territorialisation. Agents
prevent unwanted migrants from setting foot on U.S. soil by physically blocking their
access at border posts. European airports are designed so that rights of asylum are much
more restricted for someone standing on the inside of a lounge door. Judges rule on
whether a lighthouse or abandoned section of bridge is dry land and thus the gateway to
entering the United States, or a waypoint in a journey that will end in forced repatriation.
A second major implication of remote control is that it undermines one of the consti-
tutive features of the modern state –monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement.
States directly and indirectly share this control. They share it most directly in the U.S. pre-
clearance programme in certain foreign airports, U.S. security screenings of travellers on
foreign soil, juxtaposed controls such as those around the English Channel, and shiprider
schemes of European states oﬀ West Africa or the United States in the waters of the
Western Hemisphere. Sociological legitimacy lies on a continuum, and the legitimacy of
dual or multiple state controls in the same territory is not completely established. At
least formally, states claim that they have full autonomy over practices in their territory
and only allow in foreign agents under conditions of their choosing. The sensitivity of
foreign intervention often causes weaker states to hide the practices of stronger states
for whom they are doing the business of migration control.
Rather than each nation-state exercising full practical sovereignty over its own territory,
there is a ‘hierarchy of sovereignty’ (Lake 2009) in which more powerful states exercise con-
siderable inﬂuence over migratory movements from and through other states’ territories.
This is not only accomplished by the unique U.S. hyper-power, but also by middle
powers like Australia and Canada, which have stationed migration control liaison agents
at foreign airports around the world and which share intelligence with the United States.
Measuring deterrence
Careful speciﬁcation of space is also critical for eﬀorts to establish the extent to which
states control unauthorised immigration, particularly clandestine entries. Many surveys
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 13
of state policies, at least in liberal democracies, are skeptical of their eﬃcacy, particularly
once a particular migration circuit is consolidated through social networks and other feed-
back mechanisms of ‘cumulative causation’ (Massey et al. 1999; Cornelius et al. 2004). A
key distinction in deterrence is whether potential migrants are dissuaded from ever leaving
from their homes in the ﬁrst place – remote deterrence – and whether they succeed in
illegally crossing a border once they have undertaken the enterprise – immediate physical
deterrence (FitzGerald and Alarcón 2013). The distinction has been empirically measured
in surveys in which there is evidence of remote deterrence, as potential migrants reported
they were afraid to attempt a clandestine crossing because of the physical risks, but little
immediate physical deterrence of those who made the decision to attempt an illegal cross-
ing and typically persevered until they succeeded (Hicken, Fishbein, and Lisle 2011).
Measuring deterrence is a diﬃcult task, as it is hard to address the counterfactual of how
much more deterrence there would be in the absence of border controls, given that myriad
economic and social factors are not held constant in the real world (Hatton 2017). Remote
control takes place on a continuum of distance. Control and deterrence takes place over
much longer distances and across multiple state borders than the kinds of deterrence
simply measured at a given land border (Seghetti 2014). Moreover, remote controls
have countervailing eﬀects in diﬀerent countries. The paradox of transit states like Libya
is that on the one hand, knowledge of buﬀering can deter some potential migrants from
ever even attempting to enter the buﬀer’s territory. Repatriations and other expulsions
drive migrants further away. On the other hand, migrants already in the buﬀer country
who face hostile conditions have an incentive to keep moving to a safer and more welcom-
ing country (FitzGerald 2019). Taking into account remote control suggests far more
deterrence than simply estimating how many people cross a border without papers.
Limits of remote control
The fact that there is integrated architecture of repulsion does not mean that remote
control is always successful on its own terms. Migrants creatively ﬁnd ways to circumvent
controls. Irregular migrants are aided by a people smuggling industry that has developed
around the world to facilitate irregular travel in an endless game with agents of powerful
states stationed abroad who attempt to shut down these paths (Sanchez 2015). Irregular
migrants are savvy about the power of the ﬁles. One response is to destroy passports en
route so states cannot identify the traveller and her nationality and use that knowledge
for forced repatriation. Jewish refugees in the 1940s trying to reach Palestine used this
technique, which remains a popular strategy (Yahil 1974; Zhang 2007).
Many unauthorised journeys are successful. Millions of the estimated 50 million irre-
gular migrants around the world in 2009 were able to circumvent remote controls
(UNDP 2009). In the United States alone, home to an estimated 10.5 million unauthorised
migrants in 2017, more than half came from somewhere besides Mexico and were evi-
dently able to evade remote controls on the air, land, and sea (Pew 2019). Even if many
irregular migrants entered legally and overstayed their visas, these are failures of remote
control policies aimed at preventing intending long-term immigrants from obtaining tem-
porary visas (see Düvell 2008, 487).
Remote control does not mean that states have the capacity to manage migration
exactly as they wish, or to be able to turn ﬂows on and oﬀ by pressing a button.
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Neither does the destination country always wield the most eﬀective tools to control mobi-
lity. Sending countries may have even greater power. The only modern states that seriously
restrict exit are totalitarian and usually have extensive state capacity (Zolberg 1999). They
are not constrained by the judiciaries, rights groups, and free trade lobbies identiﬁed by
Joppke (1998) and Holliﬁeld (2004) in their work on embedded liberalism.
Transit states can also maintain autonomy and refuse to cooperate with powerful des-
tination states, or quietly undermine remote controls to serve their own interests. For
example, powerful states in the EU interior like Germany are buﬀered by states at the
external border like Italy. Under the Dublin asylum system, the ﬁrst EU state of entry
is normally responsible for assessing an asylum seeker’s case. Irregular migrants are sup-
posed to be ﬁngerprinted into a common European database, EURODAC, to determine
where they ﬁrst entered the EU. Keenly aware of this dynamic, Italian authorities have
often deliberately avoided ﬁngerprinting migrants who were expected to pass through
Italy to seek asylum elsewhere (Barry 2014). States do not always want greater information
about individuals, because identiﬁcation of an individual in the state’s territory is linked to
the duty to protect rights. Turning a blind eye toward transit migrants is a means of
evading obligations.
Finally, the ability of states to exercise remote controls is contingent on institutional
factors in particular spaces. The courts are a constraint on extra-territorial maritime inter-
ception in the unique supranational environment of parties to the European Convention
on Human Rights. The courts in the other three cases only constrain state action in legally
liminal spaces, such as gulag, classical, frontier, and airport barbicans, when there is a tra-
dition of drawing directly on international law and strong rights of territorial personhood.
However, transnational advocates softly constrain many policies through distinct legal and
political mechanisms. Human rights organisations and investigative journalists increas-
ingly range beyond their home countries and highlight the secret practices and eﬀects
of remote control policies by proxy that violate norms of long-distance humanitarianism
even if they successfully evade the spirit of refugee law. Courts draw from civil society’s
knowledge to establish the risks of refoulement when deciding landmark cases. Feedback
loops between the legal and political mechanisms intensify their eﬀects. At the same time,
the willingness of transit and origin states to cooperate with the Global North on mobility
controls, such as restricting exit, buﬀering transit, and allowing readmission, is linked to
other interests in relations of asymmetric interdependence, in ways that can inhibit power-
ful destination states from simply imposing their will (FitzGerald 2019).
As states continue to probe for ways to ratchet up remote controls, research is needed to
further assess the conditions under which institutions constrain state action. Better
measurements of the deterrent eﬀect, if any, of speciﬁc remote controls is also urgent.
Finally, as the extent of remote controls becomes better publicised, particularly in buﬀer
states, the reactions of civil society and courts will determine the extent to which these pol-
icies are seen as legitimate. Just how far these policies undermine a single state’s monopoly
over the legitimate means of movement continues to evolve.
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